2009,21: How corporate cultures coevolve with the business environment : the case of firm growth crises and industry evolution by Cordes, Christian et al.
 
 
 
# 0921 
 
How Corporate Cultures Coevolve  
with the Business Environment: The Case of  
Firm Growth Crises and Industry Evolution 
 
by 
 
Christian Cordes  
Peter J. Richerson  
Georg Schwesinger
Max Planck Institute of Economics 
Evolutionary Economics Group 
Kahlaische Str. 10  
07745 Jena, Germany 
Fax: ++49-3641-686868 
The Papers on Economics and Evolution are edited by the 
Evolutionary Economics Group, MPI Jena. For editorial correspondence, 
please contact: evopapers@econ.mpg.de 
 
ISSN 1430-4716 
 
© by the author 
 #0921 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How Corporate Cultures Coevolve with the Business Environment: The Case 
of Firm Growth Crises and Industry Evolution 
 
 
Christian Cordes, Peter J. Richerson, and Georg Schwesinger* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper shows how cognitive human dispositions that take effect at the level of an individual 
firm’s corporate culture have repercussions on an industry’s evolution. In our theory, the latter is 
attributable to evolving corporate cultures coupled with changes in a firm’s business 
environment. With the help of a formal model of evolving corporate cultures, we demonstrate 
how firms can establish a cooperative cultural regime that yields competitive advantages in an 
innovative, fast changing environment. Depending on within-firm social learning processes and 
cognitive constraints of human agents, organizations then reach a critical cognitive firm size in 
their development beyond which the level of cooperation deteriorates rapidly – they 
systematically face a growth crisis. Organizations successful in such an environment and 
reaching a critical technological size may, however, reap economies of scale in a later, mature 
and stable business environment with altered corporate culture. Furthermore, we relate these 
findings to empirical evidence on firm survival and performance in different industries, the 
evolution of organizational structures, technological advancements in production technologies, 
and identify some determinants of market structures. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a long-standing interest of researchers in the field of the theory of the firm in the 
determinants and consequences of firm growth (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Ijiri and Simon, 1967; 
Albach et al., 1984; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994; Witt, 2007). In this paper, we offer a 
behavioral explanation of firm growth crises and corporations’ culture-based performance in 
different business environments by relating firm development and cognitive constraints of human 
agents. Humans’ cognitive apparatus and its constraints involved in structuring our social world 
evolved in a natural environment and still have implications for firm development. Moreover, we 
include two ideas concerning the primary sources of performance differences among firms: (1) 
the impact of the changing business environment or industry on organizational performance (e.g., 
Porter, 1980) and (2) the particular differences between organizations’ capabilities and 
corresponding corporate cultures as drivers of competitive advantage (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Our analysis of firm development crosses three levels of analysis: the entrepreneur’s or 
business leader’s influence in the socialization of employees, the evolving corporate culture as a 
result of collective learning processes in a growing firm, and the changing role of the 
corporation’s external business environment on its success. In this context, the evolution of 
business organizations moves through phases as they make the transition from small to large. 
This transition is characterized by a typical form of crisis. Therefore, although businesses vary in 
many respects, they experience common problems arising at similar stages of their development 
(e.g., Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Greiner, 1998). These recurrent patterns, we argue, are 
amenable to theoretical analysis. Moreover, the determinants and consequences of firm growth 
take center stage in an analysis of the evolution of an industry. While a firm’s corporate culture 
influences an organization’s success and is itself influenced by the consequences of firm success, 
especially increasing organizational size, the coevolution of firms’ corporate cultures with a 
changing business environment accounts for regularities in industry evolution and reveals some 
forces governing these distinctive developments. 
Our search for recurrent patterns in firm growth and industry evolution is guided by a model 
of cultural learning within organizations in combination with firm development in different 
business environments. It features a critical cognitive limit on firm size determined by human 
social predispositions, an innovative business environment favoring a cooperative corporate 
culture, and another, more mature business environment that allows for the realization of 
economies of scale based on a monitoring regime after the firm has reached a critical technical 
size. A number of distinctive predictions are derived regarding the relation between firm 
development and the evolution of an industry. Questions are raised on how evolving corporate 
cultures affect market structure and firm performance as well as on how an entrepreneur or 
business leader influences these developments. 
The article is organized as follows. The relation between a firm’s corporate culture and its 
business environment is the subject matter of Section 2. Section 3 presents findings on changes in 
humans’ social behavior when group size increases and relates this to evolved cognitive 
dispositions and firm growth crises. Section 4 lays out the model of evolving corporate cultures 
in different business environments, while Section 5 derives predictions from it, discusses them, 
and relates these to empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. The role of corporate cultures in different business environments 
While most economic theories of the firm posit clearly defined “production frontiers” to 
facilitate analysis, real-world organizations face conflicting constraints. Some of these constraints 
can be better understood when firm evolution is interpreted as a story of coevolution between an 
organization’s corporate culture and its changing business environment (e.g., Freeman and 
Boeker, 1984; Schein, 1992; Kauffman and Macready, 1995; Hodgson, 1996; Teece et al., 1997; 
Hermalin, 2001). By doing so, we capture different patterns in firm development that finally will 
help explain the evolutionary paths that industries may follow. Within the scope of our analysis, 
we differentiate between two business environments – an innovative, nascent, and rapidly 
changing environment and a mature, stable environment – which favor different corporate 
cultures, a cooperative regime and a monitoring regime.1 The question is what kinds of culture 
are likely to be adaptive and persist in the face of a certain business environment? 
In innovative environments, where the range of environment variations is large and 
unpredictable, traditional mechanisms of coordination devised for stable business environments, 
such as rules and routines, are inadequate as contingencies cannot be accounted for in a proper 
way (Katz, 1964; Thompson, 1967). Therefore, in these complex, uncertain environments, 
organizations depend on the discretionary contributions of their members to maintain efficiency, 
flexibility of response, and coordination (for empirical evidence see Gittell, 2000). If a firm’s 
employees restrict their contributions exclusively to what is specified in their employment 
contracts, this would severely impair its functioning. The organization must achieve the 
necessary adaptation by a high degree of autonomy, entrepreneurial spirit, and discretion given to 
its members, which again implies that monitoring fails as a means of keeping in check 
opportunistic behavior (Cooter and Eisenberg, 2001). The firm must, therefore, rely on 
cooperative employees. Cooperative behavior within organizations involves actions that go 
beyond the call of duty and are not explicitly recognized by the employing organization’s formal 
reward system (e.g., Deckop et al., 1999), thereby contributing to organizational effectiveness 
and innovativeness (for a review of some empirical evidence see Podsakoff and MacKenzie, 
1997). Such behavior reduces the need for more formal mechanisms of control.2 
Hence, the competitive advantage of ventures based on a cooperative corporate culture is not 
the result of scale but of the extra effort spent by employees identifying with their organization, 
even though this effort is not specifically stipulated in an explicit contract. Members put the 
interest of the work unit ahead of their self-interests (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Witt, 
2007). Moreover, cooperation fosters team spirit, morale, and cohesiveness of a group. 
Employees who are willing to take on responsibilities, actively disseminate information, or learn 
new skills enhance an organization’s ability to adapt to changes in its dynamic environment.3 
These small firms have comparative advantages at exploiting new business opportunities, an 
activity that involves search, risk taking, experimentation, and flexibility (Schumpeter, 1934; 
Tichy, 1983; March, 1991). A corporate culture based on cooperative – rather than opportunistic 
– behavior among employees is a source of sustainable competitive advantage in dynamic 
business environments (Barney, 1986; Rob and Zemsky, 2002). 
                                                 
1 This bears some resemblance to Winter’s (1984) discrimination between stylized entrepreneurial and routinized 
regimes. 
2 For instance, Agell (2004) finds that small corporations rely less on pecuniary incentives and have a more hostile 
attitude toward incentive schemes based on competition. These firms rely more on social work norms, group identity, 
and peer pressure. 
3 As a classical example, Chandler Jr. (1962, p. 52-113) presented the case of DuPont’s formal departmental 
organizational structure after World War I that inhibited intense communication between employees, which is 
essential in the development and introduction of new products. 
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On the other hand, larger corporations do relatively better at exploiting existing possibilities 
that require skills such as refinement, production, efficiency, and execution. More stable settings 
allow for investments in, for example, expensive capital goods for mass production. Moreover, 
while firms that act in very innovative business environments have to rely on non-hierarchical 
lines of communication to ensure flexible responses, hierarchical modes of communication seem 
more appropriate as routine production tasks become more prevalent in a mature business 
environment (e.g., Crémer, 1993). Organizations facing a stable task environment can rely on 
rules to achieve their adaptation to such an environment (Thompson, 1967, p. 71). The 
employees’ effort and results of performance would most probably be easy to observe and 
control. Firms can then establish a formalized regime of a detailed, hierarchical monitoring of the 
employees’ actions to prevent opportunistic behavior (see Williamson, 2002). Furthermore, larger 
organizations are able to realize size-related economies of scale (Pratten, 1971; Jovanovic and 
MacDonald, 1994). 
A firm facing such a mature business environment at a later stage of industry evolution 
requiring low-cost production strategies implements a culture that emphasizes efficiency instead 
of cooperation, as it was the case in the early, innovative environment. Such a development of an 
industry is, for example, observed in markets when the early appearance of dramatically different 
versions of a product or service is followed by the later emergence of a few dominant designs, 
where economies of scale gain in importance. In the longer run, however, large companies with a 
sizable market share may enter a stage of ossification characterized by a lack of innovative 
activity, managerial inflexibility, and the avoidance of risks (e.g., Arrow, 1974, p. 49; Teece et 
al., 1997). These corporations are then viable only until there is a major change in the business 
environment calling for a more flexible corporate culture. 
 
 
3. Critical group size and firm growth crises 
Group size affects many aspects of group life (e.g., Olson, 1994; Spoor and Kelly, 2004). As 
a group, such as a firm, grows larger, many problems appear: members of larger groups tend to 
be less satisfied with their membership, are absent more often, contribute less often to group 
activities, and are less likely to cooperate with one another (e.g., Markham et al., 1982; Albanese 
and van Fleet, 1985; Kerr, 1989; Levine and Moreland, 1990, 1998; Forsyth, 2006, ch. 9). 
Moreover, there is more misbehavior in larger, more anonymous groups; coordination problems, 
free riding, and motivation losses often prevent reaping the productive potential that larger 
groups offer. For instance, a meta-analysis of 31 field studies of the size-performance relationship 
of firm organizations by Gooding and Wagner (1985) indicates that there is a consistent negative 
subunit size-performance correlation (also Wagner, 1995). In an experimental study, Kerr (1989) 
presented evidence for a decline in perceived self-efficacy with increasing group size for public 
goods problems (also Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Mukhopadhaya, 2003). Subjects generally 
perceive smaller groups to be more efficacious and cooperative than larger groups. 
Anthropologist Carleton Coon (1946) argued that small, natural groups in which people know 
one another personally and meet and communicate habitually form the fundamental units of 
human organization. Inclusion within a small, intensely interacting group reduces social distance 
among its members weakening the sharp distinction between their own and others’ welfare. 
Further, Coon claimed that the only successful way to organize human agents in complex 
societies and institutions is through combination of such small groups as face-to-face 
organizations. Essential organizational processes are grounded in person-to-person relationships 
that are not part of, for example, the control system maintained by a firm’s management. 
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In line with Coon’s classical argument, Dunbar (1993; 2008) shows that human social 
groupings exhibit unique and distinct size and structure. Thereby, he draws on insights from 
different disciplines that indicate the existence of cognitive constraints on our ability to maintain 
social, personalized relationships at a given level of emotional intensity. To a great extent, the 
evolution of primate brains was driven by the need to coordinate and manage increasingly large 
social groups. The finding that average species social group size correlates with relative 
neocortex size gives an expected size of human groups of about 150, which corresponds with the 
average size of clans in hunter-gatherer and horticulturalist societies (Sawaguchi and Kudo, 1990; 
Zhou et al., 2005).4 Groups below this maximum size can develop a deeper degree of social 
coherence and a higher level of intra-group cooperation. What is more, groups of similar size are 
also found in large-scale organizations of contemporary society.5 
In the context of firm development, Witt (1998; 2007) argues that intense intra-organizational 
communication processes are a prerequisite for a high degree of “cognitive coherence” via shared 
“cognitive frames” among its members (also Hodgson, 1996). The latter affect the interpretation 
of information, the coordination of dispersed knowledge, and the motivation to contribute to a 
common goal instead of private interests. Within these processes of social interaction, 
observational learning from social models of behavior plays a crucial role. An entrepreneur or 
business leader is a prominent role model that exerts influence in the socialization of employees 
and the implementation of a cooperative corporate culture as a shared cognitive frame. In our 
model of evolving corporate cultures, we will account for this prominent role model in intra-firm 
learning. “Cognitive coherence” or the related concept of “group identity” (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2005) are, however, impaired as the organization’s size increases and the frequency of face-to-
face interactions declines and with it the entrepreneur’s influence in the socialization of 
employees. 
Consequently, while at a natural group size, cooperative behavior can be maintained on the 
basis of personal loyalties, social role models, and face-to-face contacts, with larger groups, this 
not only becomes much more difficult, but gives rise to rather dramatic changes in the group 
members’ behavior: the more frequent appearance of opportunistic behavior among peer 
employees in a growing group in combination with a dwindling influence of a role model such as 
the entrepreneur allows for the rapid spreading of self-interested behaviors. Employees who are 
willing to contribute to the benefit of the organization and who are easily motivated by a 
cooperative corporate culture, rather suddenly change their behavior when the firm reaches a 
critical group size (e.g., Schelling, 1972; Grofman, 1974; Gladwell, 2000; Card et al., 2008). By 
incorporating human social learning biases that influence cultural transmission, the model of 
evolving corporate cultures analyzed in the next section will account for such a critical cognitive 
firm size and the rather sudden changes that occur when an organization reaches this size. 
Thus, given the fundamentals of humans’ psychology operating through the evolution of 
organizations’ cultures, firms should – in the course of their development – systematically face 
growth constraints and corresponding growth crises. As firms reach this critical cognitive size, 
effective coordination of tasks, information-flow through direct person-to-person contacts, and 
overall willingness to contribute to group aims are impaired. The exact critical cognitive size at 
which cooperation collapses depends on several aspects external to our model: for example, the 
number of members in an agent’s private networks, the maturity of the group, the personalities of 
group members, the details of a firm’s norms, or general cultural influences. For instance, the 
                                                 
4 The neocortical areas involved include those for the recognition of faces, maternal behaviors, and vocalization that 
are known to be critical for the maintenance of social bonds. 
5 Most professional armies throughout history, e.g., have a basic unit (the company) of about 150 men. 
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deleterious effects on collective outcomes of increasing group size may partly be overridden 
when collective identity is high (see Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Wagner, 1995). In any case, we 
expect this cognitive constraint to systematically take effect in firm development and that it 
should be possible to determine a certain range of group sizes wherein it becomes eminent. 
 
 
4. A model of evolving corporate cultures 
To portray firms’ evolving corporate cultures as a key force shaping an industry’s evolution, 
we focus on the cultural transmission by social learning of two kinds of behavior, cooperative 
and opportunistic, in firms of varying size. Besides the common assumption of an inclination 
toward selfish, opportunistic behavior, we consider a human behavioral disposition for 
cooperation (see the abundant evidence from game theory and experimental economics, e.g., 
Rubin, 1982; Güth and van Damme, 1998; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). 
Cooperation frequently emerges spontaneously in small- and medium-sized groups (Henrich et 
al., 2001; Boyd and Richerson, 2002; Richerson and Boyd, 2005). Nevertheless, cooperative 
tendencies are highly labile, as is shown dramatically by the cross-cultural variation in behavior 
in the ultimatum and public goods games (Henrich et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008). 
According to Deal and Kennedy (1982), also the cross-firm variation in levels of cooperative 
behavior can be expected to be high. Hence, to understand how corporate cultures evolve, we 
account for the processes that change the frequencies of cooperative and opportunistic behaviors 
in a growing organization. 
Models of cultural evolution allow one to deduce the group-level consequences of individual-
level psychologies, decision rules, and behaviors (Henrich and Boyd, 2002; van den Bergh and 
Gowdy, 2009). These models involve deriving recursion equations in discrete time that allow us 
to predict the frequency of a certain cultural variant in a population in the next stage of the 
cultural evolutionary process given its frequency in the present stage (see, as points of origin, 
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985).6 In the following model, we look 
at the transmission of a dichotomous cultural trait within a firm, the variants labeled by  and , 
where  represents the variant “cooperative behavior” and  the variant “opportunistic 
behavior”. The state of the group is determined by the frequency of employees with the variant 
, labeled 
c o
c o
c p  (the frequency of the opportunistic variant is therefore described by . p−1 )
Cultural transmission from one individual to another is typically emotionally or cognitively 
biased; people tend to acquire some behavioral variants more easily than others (Richerson and 
Boyd, 2005; Norenzayan and Heine, 2005). Hence, for an analysis of the evolution of corporate 
cultures, we need to understand how cognition directs social learning toward certain individuals 
or cultural contents. To do so, we take account of intra-firm socialization processes via cultural 
role models, an inherent attractiveness to adopt the opportunistic behavior, and the influence of 
the frequency of a certain behavior within a firm on the behavior of single employees. 
 
A direct and a conformist bias in social learning 
The influence of peers’ behaviors is crucial in both maintaining a high level of cooperation 
and moving a group away from that regime toward the prevalence of opportunistic behavior. This 
fact is captured in the model by a conformity bias and a direct bias operating on cultural 
transmission. Due to the conformity bias, agents are more likely to pick the cultural variant, i.e., 
                                                 
6 A cultural variant is defined as an idea, skill, belief, attitude, or value that is acquired by social learning and that 
influences an individual’s behavior. 
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in our context, cooperative or opportunistic behavior, that is modeled and approved by the 
majority of group members, whereas they discriminate against behaviors that are rare in the 
group. Anthropological and psychological evidence indicates the existence of such a heuristic in 
social learning (Aronson et al., 2002; Kameda and Diasuke, 2002; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; 
Henrich, 2004). Equation (1) formalizes conformist transmission within a group of interacting 
members (see Henrich, 2001). As is shown in the Appendix A, the frequency of c  after direct 
and conformist biased transmission, p ′′ , given that it was p′  before transmission, is expressed 
by 
 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }coppppp μηη −−−′′−′+′=′′ 1121 . 
 
The final term in (1) models the direct bias, coμ  ( 10 ≤≤ coμ ), favoring the cultural variant , 
i.e., the opportunistic behavior (Boyd and Richerson, 1980).
o
7 An employee may recognize, by 
observing colleagues behaving opportunistically, the extra benefits accruing from it. As a 
consequence, she may lower her effort for the group’s goals implying an increased relative 
importance of her selfish interests. We suppose that each  employee has a c coμ  chance of 
switching to the opportunistic behavioral variant. 
The term ( 12 −′p )η  in Equation (1) measures the conformist transmission bias. Parameter η , 
which varies between 0 and 1, gives the strength of conformity relative to the direct bias coμ  in 
human cognition, i.e., it scales the cognitive weight given to the frequency of a behavior in a 
group (see Henrich, 2001).8 The term ( )12 −′p
5.0>
 takes on values between -1 and 1, implying that 
when the frequency of cooperative behavior among employees is less than one half, the 
conformity bias is negative. When ′p  the conformist term favors the cooperative behavioral 
variant. 
 
Socialization processes within the firm via cultural role models 
Next, we incorporate a socialization phase into the model (here we draw on previous work 
done in Cordes et al., 2008). An entrepreneur or business leader plays an outstanding role in the 
socialization process of a firm’s employees. By offering herself as a role model and 
implementing a business conception as a shared cognitive frame within the firm, an entrepreneur 
provides crucial cognitive inputs in organizing production and trade (Schein, 1992; Witt, 1998; 
2000). Thereby, she can motivate and coordinate firm members, foster cooperation, and hold 
down opportunism. In model-based social learning there exists a human predisposition to imitate 
successful or prestigious individuals, i.e., there is a model-based bias taking effect in cultural 
transmission. Evidence form social psychology and anthropology shows that the adoption of 
cultural variants is frequently conditioned by the observable attributes of individuals exhibiting 
the variant (e.g., Rogers, 1983; Harrington Jr., 1999; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Labov, 2001). 
An entrepreneur can draw on this human characteristic by providing a prestigious role model 
for social learning processes within the firm and by demonstrating cooperative attitudes as a 
worth-while. We assume that a firm’s employee is influenced by the entrepreneur and  peers, 
i.e., the other employees. To depict the differing importances of these role models in social 
n
                                                 
7 In cultural evolution, individuals are more likely to adopt some cultural variants based on their content (Richerson 
and Boyd, 2005). Such a direct bias can result from the calculation of costs and benefits associated with alternative 
variants or from cognitive structures that cause people to preferentially adopt some variants rather than others. 
8 Here, η  is considered to be small, for when η , e.g., exceeds 0.5, no rare behavior ever spreads. 
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learning, we assign different weights to them:  denotes the entrepreneur’s influence and  
measures the weight of an ordinary member of the group.
EA PA
9 Here, a large value of  implies that 
the employee is disproportionately likely to acquire the cultural variant of the entrepreneur. We 
do, however, argue that the entrepreneur’s influence as a role model is decreasing with a growing 
group size . Given these assumptions, the total, i.e., firm size adjusted, actual weight of the 
entrepreneur or business leader in cultural transmission is given by 
EA
n
 
(2) 
PE
Eα
EA , nαα +=
 
where Eα  is the basic weight of the entrepreneur and Pα  the basic weight of any given peer 
employee ( nPα ααα ==== ...21 ). Different values for Eα  reflect the fact that entrepreneurs 
differ in their ability to exert influence on other individuals due to personal characteristics, i.e., 
their charismatic potential (social skills, personal work ethic, ability to articulate a persuasive 
vision, etc.) and the wider cultural context. 
Accordingly, the weight of a member of an employee’s the peer group is given by 
 
(3) 
PE
Pα
PA . nαα +=
 
Within the group, the cumulative influence of the employees on the social learning process is 
growing with an increasing firm size and a dwindling role of the entrepreneur. Both weights,  
and P , are normalized by the denominator so that they give the weight of a model relative to the 
other models encountered by the individual in question. 
EA
A
To characterize socialization of group members in a growing firm, the model must allow us to 
predict the probability of agents acquiring trait  or , given a particular set of models 
(entrepreneur/leader,  peers) that have different total weights ( , ) and group size  (also 
modifying values of E  and P ). We assume the entrepreneur – in her function as a prominent 
role model – to be always cooperative. As is shown briefly in the Appendix B and more detailed 
in previous work (Cordes et al., 2008), given the average pairing probability of role models and 
their changing weights in the cultural transmission process, we yield a PE  probability of 
transmitting behavior  to each member of the firm. Thus, the partial recursion for the 
socialization phase is expressed by 
c o
n
A
EA PA
A
n
A
pnA+
c
 
(4) . PE pnAA +=p′
 
The complete recursion for p , depicting the change of the level of intra-firm cooperation as 
an indicator of a firm’s corporate culture, over one conformist learning step and one socialization 
phase, is obtained by substituting (4) into (1): 
 
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }coPEPEPEPE pnAApnAApnAApnAAp μηη −−−++−+++=′′ 1121 . 
 
                                                 
9 Accordingly,  reflects the weight of an employee’s fellow employees, whereby PnA 1=+ PE nAA . 
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We can now calculate the equilibrium frequencies of the cooperative behavioral variant 
among the firm’s employees: at equilibrium, the group’s composition does not change, so 
. By subtracting 0=−′′ pp p  from both sides of (5), we determine the equilibria of the coupled 
recursions implied by (5). Solving for , denoting the equilibrium frequency of the cooperative 
behavior , we find two equilibria 
pˆ
c
(6)  and 1ˆ1 =p
 
(7) 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) η
ηηημηημ
2/3
2
2 4
811311
ˆ
an
anananananan
p coco
−+−+−−+−+−= , 
 
E
Pa α
α= .10 
 
Figure 1 plots  as a function of p ′′ p  as given by the recursion described by Equation (5) for 
all values of p  from zero to one. The intersections of this function and the dashed 45-degree line 
(where ) indicate the recursion’s equilibria. Given a certain firm size ( ) and the 
parameter values chosen here (
pp =′′ 50=n
1.0=η , 3.0=coμ ), a high influence of the entrepreneur in within-
firm social learning, as measured by Eα  (here 95.0=Eα ), can lead to a perfect cooperative 
regime ( ). However, the upper equilibrium, , becomes unstable with a decreasing 
influence of the entrepreneur in socialization (e.g., 
1=pˆ 1pˆ
0 8.=Eα ). It is then that the direct bias 
favoring opportunistic behavior, coμ , can push the group away from the upper equilibrium at  
and toward the equilibrium given by , which is characterized by a lower level of within-firm 
cooperation. The position of the second equilibrium, 2 , depends, ceteris paribus, on E
1pˆ
2pˆ
pˆ α : the 
lower the entrepreneur’s charismatic potential, the lower is the final equilibrium of the 
cooperative trait in the firm (e.g., when 5.0=Eα ). 
 
 
E0.95
E0.8
E0.5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p
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Figure 1: The equilibria for Equation 50.1, co0.3, n50
n5
n25
n100
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p
p
Figure 2: The equilibria for Equation 50.1, co0.3, E0.8
 
 
 
                                                 
10 A third solution for  yields a value greater than one and is therefore irrelevant in this context. pˆ
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Figure 2 shows the equilibria for Equation (5) in the case of varying firm sizes holding the 
entrepreneur’s charismatic potential, Eα , constant ( 8.0=Eα , 1.0=η , 3.0=coμ ). As can be 
seen, a perfect cooperative regime ( 1ˆ =p ) can be reached in a very small group ( ). With 
increasing group size, a diluted influence of the entrepreneur or business leader in socialization, 
and a rather high direct bias, this equilibrium level of cooperation in the firm becomes unstable 
( , ). The larger the firm, the lower is, ceteris paribus, the final equilibrium level of 
cooperation within the group. 
5=n
25=n 100=n
Moreover, by setting the parameters of our system of recursions, we can model its long run 
behavior by conceptually iterating Equation (5) recursively for many conformist learning and 
socialization steps. This is done in Figure 3 that visualizes the values of p , i.e., the share of 
cooperative agents within the firm, depending on group size as measured by the number of 
employees. It illustrates the occurrence of distinct firm growth crises. The group starts from a 
high level of cooperation ( ). For different values of 9.0=p Eα , i.e., the entrepreneur’s 
charismatic potential, we yield different critical cognitive firm sizes: when the organization 
reaches this size, the level of cooperation deteriorates rapidly due to a dwindling influence of the 
entrepreneur in socialization, new opportunistic agents introduced by the direct bias, coμ , and the 
conformity bias that, while having stabilized the preceding cooperative regime, now spurs the 
spreading of the more frequent behavior . Therefore, ceteris paribus, contingent on the 
entrepreneur’s charisma, firms have different potentials of maintaining a high level of 
cooperation as the firm grows. Hence, the observed range of critical cognitive firm sizes depends, 
among other things, on the distribution of charismatic potentials (as measured by 
o
Eα ) in the pool 
of entrepreneurs. Firms do, however, inevitably reach this threshold in the course of their growth 
process. The cognitive constraints on group size take effect in the development of the firm by 
systematically causing growth crises.11 
 
Modeling firm growth in different business environments 
Next, we model the firm’s growth process by connecting its evolving corporate culture with 
firm performance in different business environments. In Section 2 we have argued that ventures 
based on a cooperative corporate culture reap a competitive advantage due to the extra effort 
spent by employees sharing a cognitive frame or identity. This effect is especially significant in 
rapidly changing, innovative business environments where flexible responses of employees are 
inevitable to firm success. To account for these gains from cooperation, we assume that each 
cooperative employee contributes to the firm’s profit an amount measured by . Each 
opportunistic agent, on the other hand, causes a loss of  in such a nascent, innovative business 
environment.  are measured in units of a standard employee wage. Furthermore, we capture 
the fact that firms can realize economies of scale in a later, more mature business environment by 
allowing for an endogenous modification of the costs of opportunistic behavior. We will argue 
that the latter change in the course of firm development and dependent on the total number of 
employees, n . Then, the following recursion describes the firm’s growth process: 
cr
or
ocr /
 
(8) ( ) ( ) ( )( )nrpnrpnn oc +−++=′ 111 . 
                                                 
11 Organizations of such an intermediate size are especially vulnerable to failure, an observation for which there is 
ample empirical and theoretical evidence (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Boone et al., 2004). Our theory offers 
one explanation for why this is the case. 
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Here,  represents the number of cooperative employees times the unit resources needed 
to pay their wages plus the profit they make. Hence, to support one employee requires the 
generation of one unit of revenue, while  is the profit resulting from their cooperative behavior 
that allows new employees to be hired. Accordingly, 
( crpn +1 )
cr ( ) ( )( )nrpn o+− 11  is the aggregate 
contribution to a firm’s income yielded by opportunistic employees. The following expression 
describes the relationship between  and n : or
 
(9) ( ) c
techcrit
co rnn
nrnr 2
_ +
+−= .12 
 
In this context, the function  captures the effect of the opportunity to realize economies of 
scale in a stable business environment (e.g., Pratten, 1971; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994): the 
critical technical firm size, , determines the organizational size at which opportunistic 
agents start to contribute a profit – instead of a loss – to firm development. For large firm sizes, 
o  is asymptotically approaching c . Thus, if the firm reaches this critical technological size, 
economies of scale and the task structure in a stable business environment compensate for the 
losses caused by opportunistic agents in smaller firms that are based on a cooperative corporate 
culture. For instance, the task structure of larger firms that engage in mass production of 
standardized goods in more mature markets is characterized by a relatively higher share of 
routinized exercises. The effort and results of performance of these tasks are relatively easy to 
monitor preventing great losses from shirking behavior. A monitoring regime is then sufficient to 
keep opportunism in check. At the same time, these firms are capable of reaping further cost 
advantages emanating from economies of scale and size. 
( )nro
critn _ tech
rr
Consequently, a firm’s business environment enters Equation (8) in several ways. We 
imagine an industry’s evolution starting in a nascent stage characterized by a high degree of 
uncertainty and change that prevents economies of scale from being realized. At the same time, it 
enables relatively high gains emanating from cooperatively-minded employees in rather small 
firms below their critical cognitive size that are characterized by a high share of cooperative 
agents (as measured by c  and r p  respectively). Then, according to Equation (8), firms with a 
high share of opportunistic agents fail, which may be due to an entrepreneur that is not well-
suited as a role model, while those capable of maintaining a cooperative regime prosper and 
grow. In this dynamic business environment, the higher level of discretion left to the employees 
entails high potential costs of opportunistic behavior, i.e., it implies a high negative value of o . 
The same would hold true for older industries that nevertheless exhibit a fast changing market 
because of a continuously high level of innovative activity. In such a setting we would still 
expect small firms – or larger organizations based on small subunits – with cooperative corporate 
cultures to dominate. If, however, a firm’s business environment develops toward a high degree 
of certainty over time and firm growth, this makes possible larger investments in standardized 
production technologies that enable size-related economies of scale and the performance of 
routine tasks. This enters Equation (8) via a modification of the costs and benefits accruing from 
r
                                                 
12 For simplicity, we assume a close to symmetrical profit/loss case in the beginning for very small firm sizes where 
. oc rr ≈
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opportunistically behaving agents in larger and older firms, as measured by  in combination 
with ( , the share of opportunistic employees in a corporation.
( )nro)p−1 13 
At equilibrium the firm size does not change, so 0=−′ nn . Solving Equation (8) for  
denoting a firm’s equilibrium size yields: 
nˆ
 
(10)  and 01 =nˆ
nˆ
5.0
 
(11) . pnn techcrittechcrit __2 2−=
 
The equilibrium at  is unstable implying that above it firm size is increasing, while it is 
shrinking below it. We ignore solutions that yield negative values for , which is the case when 
, which again entails a continuously growing firm. We then find that this unstable 
equilibrium increases in , i.e., a growing critical firm size has to be reached beyond which 
sustainable firm growth is facilitated. Moreover, it decreases in 
2nˆ
n
>p
techcritn _
p  as long as , i.e.,  
decreases with a growing level of cooperation within the firm. 
5.0< 2nˆp
As a consequence of our argument so far, we have a two-dimensional system of coupled 
recursions, one describing the development of p  in time (12) and another one depicting the 
changing size of a firm in the course of time (13) ( ppp Δ=−′′ , nnn Δ=−′ ): 
 
(12) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ){ } ppnAApnAApnAApnAA coPEPEPEPEp −−−−++−+++= μηη 121  1Δ
 
(13) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) nnrpnrpn ocn −+−++= 111 . Δ
 
While it is possible to solve this dynamic system analytically, the resulting terms are too complex 
to be interpreted in a straight forward manner. We can, however, visualize its dynamic properties 
to further discuss its implications.14 
 
 
5. Implications for firm growth in different business environments and industry evolution 
The model devised in the preceding section enables us to derive some interesting insights 
concerning firm growth processes in different business environments and their implications for 
industrial evolution. For this purpose, the properties of the two coupled recursions (Equations 
(12) and (13)) describing a firm’s evolving corporate culture and the connected development of 
organizational size in different markets are studied further by iterating this two-dimensional 
dynamic system for many cultural transmission and firm growth steps. 
Figure 4 shows the growth processes for three representative firms implied by Equations (12) 
and (13) over many iteration steps capturing progressing time given different values of the 
entrepreneurs’ basic weights in the socialization of employees, as measured by the parameter Eα  
( 1.0=η , 3.0=coμ , ,  and 1.0=cr 5.0=p 4=n  in the beginning). In an innovative business 
environment where a high level of intra-firm cooperation yields competitive advantages, 
                                                 
13 For simplicity and tractability, we assume gains from cooperative agents also in a mature environment, i.e., they 
are not frustrated by the new corporate culture. 
14 The corresponding author will provide exact analytical solutions upon request. 
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organizations based on a cooperative corporate culture can progress from slow initial growth to 
rapid growth. We see, however, that firms have different growth potentials at this stage of their 
development. The higher the entrepreneur’s charismatic potential, the longer the firm’s growth 
process lasts and the larger is the size finally reached before it decreases again due to the 
dwindling influence of the entrepreneur in within-organizational learning and the spreading of 
opportunistic behavior. 
Proposition 1. In the course of their growth process, firms reach a critical cognitive size 
beyond which the level of cooperation among its employees deteriorates rapidly and, 
ceteris paribus, firm size shrinks. This critical size depends on within-firm learning 
dynamics and constraints on the influence of the entrepreneur or business leader therein. 
The existence of a firm culture introduces time lags; culture really does evolve. Both the 
growth and the shrinking phase of a firm are spurred by the conformity bias. First, it stabilizes the 
cooperative regime enabling the organization to reap gains from cooperation, which is the 
majority behavior at this stage, in a variable business environment. Second, the conformity bias 
promotes the dissemination of opportunistic behavior around the critical cognitive firm size 
where it becomes more frequent among employees, finally causing a rapid decline in firm size 
and performance. This is illustrated by Figure 5 that depicts the evolution of the frequencies of 
cooperative behavior, p , in these growing firms as an indicator of an organization’s corporate 
culture. The level of p  drops rapidly after the firm has reached a certain critical cognitive size, 
again depending, ceteris paribus, on Eα . This fall in cooperation is more pronounced the higher 
the previous level of cooperation was. p  increases again as firm size shrinks due to the fact that 
the entrepreneur’s influence rises in smaller organizations. The final equilibrium values of p  and 
 reached after some oscillations can be determined analytically from Equations (12) and (13). n
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Figure 3: Levels of cooperation in growing 
firms for different Eα  given that 9.0=p  in 
the beginning ( 1.0=η , 3.0=coμ ). 
Figure 4: Firm growth paths for different Eα  
( 1.0=η , 1.0=cr , ). 250_ =techcritn
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Figure 5: Levels of cooperation in growing 
firms for the cases depicted in Figure 4. 
Figure 6: One Firm reaching the critical 
technological size, . 170_ =techcritn
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In a nascent, innovative business environment, none of the firms shown in Figure 4 would 
reach the size beyond which economies of scale in an assumed later, stable task environment 
would compensate for the losses caused by opportunistically behaving employees. In this case, 
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the critical technological firm size lies at 250_ =techcritn . However, if we lower this critical 
technological firm size, which may be caused by technological progress, a firm’s growth process 
can change significantly (see Figure 6): we now assume that this parameter amounts to 
. This organizational size is reached by the one representative firm with the most 
influential or charismatic entrepreneur in the sample (
170_ =techcritn
7.0=Eα ). The firm now attains the 
modified critical technological size before moving beyond the critical cognitive size that would 
result in rapid firm shrinkage. The successful firm’s growth path shown in Figure 6 also exhibits 
a period of slower growth sandwiched between phases of rapid organizational development, i.e., 
even in this case the firm goes through a growth crisis. Overall, this organization experiences 
continuous growth while the other two firms still face decline in the long-run (also Witt, 2000). 
Proposition 2. If firms reach – and possibly maintain for some time – a certain size in an 
innovative environment based on a cooperative corporate culture, they may be able to reap 
economies of scale based on a monitoring regime in a later stable task environment that 
necessitates such a technological minimum size. Otherwise, due to competitive pressures 
resulting from such a setting, they are likely to fail and exit the market. 
Figure 7 shows the changing shares of cooperative employees in the set of firms in the course 
of organizational development given the altered critical technological size. As can be seen, the 
successfully growing firm is characterized by a corporate culture that can handle a high share of 
opportunistically inclined agents, potentially by close monitoring and by assigning routine tasks 
whose executions are easy to observe, measure, and specify in an employment contract. Hence, a 
formalized regime of monitoring of the employees’ routine performances in this stable, mature 
business environment prevents costly opportunistic behavior, enables further organizational 
growth, and the realization of economies of scale. Firms reaching the critical technological size 
can subsequently experience a take-off. Ventures that do not reach the critical technological size 
will be unlikely to survive in this market and probably will be forced to exit, although they might 
have been very competitive in the earlier innovative environment (e.g., Audretsch and Mahmood, 
1994). The merging of organizations may provide a way for smaller firms to reach the critical 
technological firm size – potentially at the cost of their cooperative corporate cultures. 
However, not all business environments evolve into such a situation: in environments 
characterized by permanent uncertainty and complexity, making necessary continuous mutual 
adjustment, sustained effective coordination of a firm’s employees’ actions is always facilitated 
most easily in cooperative corporate cultures: 
Proposition 3. A market that is lastingly characterized by a complex, innovative, and 
uncertain business environment can be expected to host many small firms or organizational 
units that are based on cooperative corporate cultures and that stay below their critical 
cognitive size in order to yield competitive advantages related to small size. 
In addition, in such dynamic business environments, opportunistic behavior of highly 
independent, specialized employees would be especially harmful, i.e., ( )nro  would take on high 
negative values. Consultant firms, whose structure is explicitly based on small groups, are a case 
in point. Here, a cooperative culture is an appropriate means to keep in check opportunism. 
Moreover, many specialist firms are small because they occupy niches in markets that, on the one 
hand, do not allow for reaping economies of scale and that, on the other hand, necessitate non-
routine tailoring of products to the needs of costumers that relies on employees enjoying a great 
degree of discretion (e.g., Greve, 2008). Furthermore, smaller ventures relative to larger 
established firms tend to excel at exploiting new business opportunities (e.g., Winter, 1984). 
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Consequently, as is shown by the empirical evidence, many industries are dominated by small 
enterprises (see Audretsch, 1997). 
In business environments that require a relatively smaller critical technological firm size, we 
expect more firms to attain this threshold size before having crossed the critical cognitive firm 
size. This is illustrated in Figure 8, where the critical technological firm size is, ceteris paribus, 
lowered to . We now find that two out of our set of three representative firms are 
capable of exploiting economies of scale or taking advantage of easily specifiable routine tasks in 
a later business environment. These two exhibit continuous growth, albeit at different rates. 
50_ =techcritn
Proposition 4. Technological progress may lower the firm size beyond which economies of 
scale can be realized. In this case, more firms can be expected to have the potential to 
reach this critical technological size in the course of their growth process in an earlier 
innovative business environment and before reaching the critical cognitive size. Finally, 
one would expect there to be more firms active in such a market than in the case of a 
higher critical technological firm size. 
Consequently, industries with a high critical technological firm size are characterized by a 
relatively low likelihood of survival and vice versa (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994). Moreover, 
after a shakeout phase, industries of the former kind may then evolve into, for example, an 
oligopolistic structure (Klepper, 2002). Such an oligopoly would be a natural consequence of 
critical cognitive and technological firm sizes. These findings have, therefore, direct implications 
for theorizing about the determinants of market structures. 
Our analysis allows for different patterns of firm development in changing business 
environments and thus industry evolution. The first stage of firm development is characterized by 
growth through flexibility and creativity in a cooperative corporate culture. This stage often ends 
with a critical phase due to the firm’s reaching of a critical cognitive size and related changes in 
corporate culture. A venture’s likelihood of failure is extraordinarily high at this point of firm 
development. Further subsequent developmental paths of a business organization are possible: 
(1) Some firms may pass through the first growth phase and then plateauing, remaining the 
same size with some profit over a long period of time. Consequently, a corporation aware of its 
constraints may limit its own further organizational growth and stay below the critical cognitive 
firm size. It may then be restricted to a niche market that does not permit sustained firm growth 
or to highly innovative business environments. This may also be the right moment for the 
entrepreneur to sell the business – provided the owner recognizes her limitations soon enough. 
(2) A company can implement an intra-organizational subdivision of entrepreneurship to keep 
its parts below the critical cognitive firm size, while allowing for growth of the organization as a 
whole. Sub-leaders assigned to these subdivisions would then be capable of maintaining 
cooperative cultures in their groups via proximal cognitive leadership (Witt, 2007).16 Moreover, 
organizations may cope with lasting uncertainty in some innovative environments by creating 
certain subunits dedicated to deal with them, while specializing other parts in operating under 
environmental conditions of near certainty. As a result, different optimal subunit sizes with 
different corporate cultures emerge depending on the different business environments. Ideally, 
organizations can tune their structures to achieve either the capacity to adapt to a rapidly evolving 
business environment or to reap the advantages of scale production in a stable environment. In 
that case, organizational differentiation is linked to subunit performance rather than to 
organizational size per se. 
                                                 
16 Much larger groups than the natural social units require, therefore, different cognitive strategies for maintaining 
their coherence through time (e.g., Olson, 1994; Dunbar, 2008). 
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(3) Finally, a company as a whole may surpass its critical cognitive size by reaching a critical 
technological size beyond which it can realize economies of scale in an emerging stable business 
environment. Its corporate culture would then rely on a formalized regime of a detailed, 
hierarchical instructing and monitoring of the employees’ actions to prevent opportunistic 
behavior (Williamson, 2002). Precondition for this to happen is a business environment in which 
technological and market conditions allow for mass production and routinized tasks in providing 
the service or product. 
We argue here that evolving business cultures as an endogenous source of firm performance 
are one common force governing the evolution of an industry: Klepper (1996; 1997), for 
example, shows that in many markets the number of firms in an infant industry initially grows 
and then experiences a sharp decline or shakeout in the course of these firms’ further 
development (also Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994). According to our behavioral model of firm 
development, part of the shakeout phenomenon can be traced back to many organizations’ 
reaching of a critical cognitive firm size beyond which firm performance deteriorates. This 
corresponds to Wernerfelt’s (1984) perspective on organizations’ internal capabilities. 
Furthermore, also the exogenous business environment affects organizational performance 
and industry evolution: small, cooperative firms experience a shakeout if a mature business 
environment calls for larger firms realizing scale economies even if they stayed below the critical 
cognitive size in an earlier innovative business environment. In such an industry, growth is a 
prerequisite for survival (e.g., Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994). Therefore, technological 
improvements that reduce production costs while increasing the firm’s optimal scale can cause a 
shakeout of firms in a market because of cognitive constraints in firm development. On the other 
hand, larger corporations’ monitoring regimes fail in innovative business environments that 
require a high degree of cooperation on the part of the employees. This may be the case if, for 
example, an established large company’s business environment turns – due to technological 
progress – into an innovative environment again asking for a high degree of organizational 
flexibility. These processes reflect Porter’s (1980) emphasis on the impact of a changing business 
environment on organizational performance. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has shown how cognitive human dispositions that operate as forces on the 
development of an individual firm’s corporate culture have repercussions on an industry’s 
evolution. In our theory, the industry level effect is attributable to evolving corporate cultures 
coupled with changes in a firm’s business environment. With the help of a formal model of 
evolving corporate cultures, we demonstrated how firms can establish a cooperative cultural 
regime that yields competitive advantages in an innovative, fast changing environment. 
Depending on within-firm social learning processes, organizations then reach a critical cognitive 
firm size in their development beyond which the level of cooperation deteriorates rapidly – they 
systematically face a growth crisis. There is strong evidence that human social group sizes have a 
cognitive limit. Organizations successful in an early dynamic business environment and reaching 
a critical technological size may, however, reap economies of scale in a later, mature and stable 
business environment based on a monitoring regime that keeps in check employees’ opportunistic 
behavior in an altered corporate culture. Furthermore, we related these findings to firm survival 
in different industries, the evolution of organizational structures, technological advancements in 
production technologies, and identified some determinants of market structures. These findings, 
therefore, have potential implications for public policy making (e.g., Klepper, 2002). 
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This paper’s behavioral approach to firm development in varying business environments 
offered new insights on organizational performance and the evolution of industries. The emphasis 
on evolving corporate cultures shaping firm development resonates with a number of other 
theoretical avenues (e.g., Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Denison, 1984; Kreps, 1990; Kotter and 
Heskett, 1992; Schein, 1992; Lazear, 1995; Hermalin, 2001). While factors such as ownership 
structure, incentives, or financial circumstances of a business certainly are important, other 
aspects are also at work in firm development: changing group sizes, systematically appearing 
growth crises, the influence of the entrepreneur or business leader in intra-firm socialization of 
employees, evolving corporate cultures, and firm performance in different business environments 
depending on these cultures. Moreover, the fact that organizations pass different stages in the 
course of their evolution represents an important insight for management practice (e.g., Churchill 
and Lewis, 1983): managers who can assess the stage their organization is in can better 
understand emerging problems and challenges. Finally, future empirical research should probe 
the predictions of our theory. 
 
 
Appendix A 
• We assume employees to choose an individual at random from the total number of a firm’s 
employees. Due to the direct bias coμ  alone, which captures the attractiveness of opportunistic 
behavior, agents are probabilistically more likely to adopt behavior o  ( 10 ≤≤ coμ ) when they 
encounter it or to stick to it if they already behave opportunistically and meet a cooperative 
colleague. In addition, the conformist component, ( )12 −′p , which depends on the frequency of 
behavior  in the firm, modifies the adoption probabilities as described in the text. Then, the 
probabilities of switching are given by Table A1. 
c
 
Table A1 The probability of employees acquiring behavior  or  given a particular behavior 
encountered. 
c o
 
Cultural Variant of 
Probability That an Agent Acquires 
Cultural Variant 
Self Other c  o  
c  c  1 0 
c  o  [ ]{ }cop μηη )1()12(12
1 −−−′+ [ ]{ }cop μηη )1()12(12
1 −−−′−
o  c  [ ]{ }cop μηη )1()12(12
1 −−−′+ [ ]{ }cop μηη )1()12(12
1 −−−′−
o  o  0 1 
 
Using the probabilities of each possible pairing of “Self” and “Other”, we can calculate the 
frequency of behavior c  after this kind of transmission process by multiplying the former by the 
different probabilities of switching to behavior c . We get the following recursion: 
 
(A1) [ ] ( ) ( ){ } [ ]01)1()12(1
2
1121 22 pppppp co ′−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−′+′−′+′=′′ μηη ( ) . 
 
Simplifying gives Equation (1) in the text. 
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Appendix B 
• In order to account for the effects of new personnel joining the firm and the necessary 
“renewal” of the socialization of existing employees, who are then considered as if they were 
personnel just joining the firm, we suppose that in each time step a cohort of  employees 
“retires” and is replaced by  new employees who are socialized by all  old employees, plus 
the entrepreneur. In addition, we assume that all new employees show neutral behavior when 
they join the firm. Moreover, these new firm members encounter other employees at random. 
With the help of the cultural transmission table below (Table B1), we specify the probability that 
a particular set of role models with different weights makes an individual acquire the cultural 
variant c  or o , given a changing group size. 
n
n n
 
Table B1 The probability of agents acquiring trait  or o  given a particular set of models 
(Entrepreneur/Leader, Peers) that have different total weights ( , ). 
c
EA PA
 
Cultural Variant of 
Probability That an Agent of the New Cohort Acquires 
Cultural Variant 
Entrepreneur/Leader n  Peers c  o  
c  cc...  PE nAA +  0 
c  occ ,...  ( ) PE AnA 1−+  PA  
c  oocc ,,...  ( ) PE AnA 2−+  PA2  
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
c  oo...  EA  PnA  
 
The variable p  measures the frequency of the c  type in an infinite meta population of firms 
of size n . That is, for illustrative simplicity we are here modeling only the deterministic effect of 
evolutionary processes. In any given firm, stochastic effects will be important. However, in an 
infinite population of firms with particular characteristics, p  will perfectly describe the average 
frequency of the cooperative variant and ( )p−1  the opportunistic variant. Therefore, the average 
pairing probability of role models in the transmission table will have  probability of 
transmitting  to each new member of a cohort and probability 
PE pnAA +
c ( ) pnAp−1
n
 of transmitting the 
cultural variant . Thus, in an infinite population of firms of size , the partial recursion for the 
socialization phase with the frequency of  after transmission, 
o
c p′ , given that is was p  before 
transmission, is expressed by Equation (4) in the text. 
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